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Polio eradication: finishing the job and protecting the
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The articles in this theme issue of the
Bulletin address the complex policies of
polio eradication. The end of wild
poliovirus transmission is not the end of
the story, as certification of eradication,
laboratory containment, vaccination
policy, and sustainable surveillance and
response mechanisms all require
continued effort. A feasible target of
globally interrupted transmission is set
for the end of this year, and preparations
for the post-certification period are
under way. In four of the six countries
where wild poliovirus continues to
circulate, (Afghanistan, Egypt, India, and
Pakistan); the intensity of transmission
is the lowest ever recorded. In Niger
and Nigeria, where polio transmission
has increased due to low vaccination
coverage, the areas where wild poliovirus
is circulating have relatively low popula-
tion density. If multiple rounds of high
quality immunization campaigns are
conducted in all six of these countries
in early 2004, transmission can be
interrupted by the end of the year or
soon thereafter.
Once transmission has been
interrupted, global certification of
eradication will require at least another
three years (Smith et al, see pp. 24–30)
During this period, certification-standard
surveillance must be achieved and
maintained in every country, and coverage
with oral polio vaccine (OPV) must
remain sufficiently high to prevent
outbreaks caused by vaccine-derived
polioviruses (Kew et al, see pp. 16–23,
(1, 2)) The operational challenge during
this period will be to maintain high levels
of polio immunization within routine
immunization programmes and to keep
polio surveillance systems in place.
Effective laboratory containment
of wild polioviruses and all potentially
infectious materials is needed to prevent
the accidental reintroduction. National
inventories of laboratories, followed by
destruction or secure containment of
viruses and specimens, is considered a
realistic goal (Dowdle, see pp. 59–66, (3))
National laboratory inventories have
been completed or are under way in
many countries, and WHO’s Biosafety
Advisory Group is writing guidelines
for safe containment and will oversee
regular biosafety assessments.
Policy options for post-eradication
vaccination have been discussed since
1998. While oral polio vaccine (OPV)
has been the vaccine of choice for global
eradication,  scientific evidence reviewed
by a recent WHO ad hoc expert group
confirms that OPV use must stop as
soon as possible after certification (Fine
et al, see pp. 47–52, (4)) WHO and
UNICEF are preparing evidence-based
guidelines to help countries make
informed decisions about OPV cessation.
The polio partners, including the Global
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
(GAVI), are working to ensure that
affordable injectable polio vaccine (IPV),
will be available when needed (Sutter
et al, see pp. 31–39). Monovalent OPV
needs to be licenced for vaccine stockpiles.
Because wild poliovirus used in the
manufacture of IPV will also require
secure containment, WHO is coordi-
nating the development of industry
guidelines and will continue to work with
manufacturers and regulatory authorities.
The development and licensing of Sabin-
derived IPV is also being facilitated as an
added biosafety precaution. Development
of guidelines and tools is on target and
national policies and strategies for OPV
cessation should be in place at the time
of certification.
Sustained global surveillance and
response is needed to counter the risk of
polio from a laboratory or manufacturing
accident, or a polio outbreak caused by
circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus.
The International Health Regulations
(1969) and the revision process now
under way will provide an ongoing and
sustainable framework. The operational
arm of the Regulations — the WHO
Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network — detects, verifies and
responds to outbreaks of communicable
diseases (5). During the three years prior
to certification, knowledge, resources and
responsibility for response to suspected
polio outbreaks will be transferred to
the Network.
The WHO/UNICEF stockpile of
trivalent OPV, and eventually monovalent
OPV and other vaccines, will be managed
along the lines of other WHO vaccine
stockpiles, such as those for yellow fever,
meningococcal meningitis and smallpox,
that are on standby for use in outbreak
control. The vaccine stockpile and its
regular renewal will require financial
investment until the risk of polio
outbreaks has been reliably eliminated.
Polio will join smallpox as the only
infectious diseases to have been eradi-
cated. These are monumental achieve-
ments — true firsts for science and public
health — with many lessons, particularly
for the post-eradication phase. After the
certification of smallpox eradication in
1980, the budget for smallpox activities
fell dramatically. In 2002, the World
Health Assembly responded to fears that
the smallpox virus might be deliberately
used to cause harm. Existing virus stocks
were retained to allow essential research
under the auspices of the Advisory
Committee on Variola Virus Research (6).
Research includes vaccine development
for use in immunosuppressed people,
new antiviral drugs, and more specific
diagnostic tests. Thus research
continues for a disease formally
eradicated more than two decades ago.
As the articles in this theme issue show,
the challenges and issues of polio in the
post-certification phase have been
assessed. The international community
knows what to do to protect the polio
investment, and these activities need to
be adequately funded.  O
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